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Abstract— Disruption tolerant network technologies are 
becoming successful solutions that allow wireless devices 
carried by soldiers to communicate with each other and 
access the confidential information or command reliably by 
exploiting external storage nodes. Some of the most 
challenging issues in this scenario are the enforcement of 
authorization policies and the policies update for secure 
data retrieval. Cipher text-policy attribute-based encryption 
is a promising cryptographic solution to the access control 
issues. However, the problem of applying CP-ABE in 
decentralized DTNs introduces several security and privacy 
challenges with regard to the attribute revocation, key 
escrow, and coordination of attributes issued from different 
authorities. We propose a secure data retrieval scheme 
using idea for decentralized DTNs where multiple key 
authorities manage their attributes independently. We 
demonstrate how to apply the proposed mechanism to 
securely and efficiently manage the confidential data 
distributed in the disruption-tolerant military network. 
Keywords—Access control, attribute-based encryption 
(ABE), disruption-tolerant network (DTN). 
 
I.    INTRODUCTION 
Mobile nodes in military environments such as a battlefield 
or a hostile region are likely to suffer from intermittent 
network connectivity and frequent partitions.Disruption-
tolerant network (DTN) technologies are becoming 
successful solutions that allow wireless devices carried by 
soldiers to communicate with each other in this extreme 
networking environment typically when there is no end to 
end connection between source and destination pairs, the 
messages from the source node may need to wait in the 
intermediate nodes for a substantial amount of time until the 
connection would be eventually established. Storage nodes 
in DTNs where data is stored or replicated in a way such 
that only authorized mobile nodes can access the necessary 
information quickly and efficiently. Many military 
applications require increased protection of confidential 
data including access control methods that are 
cryptographically enforced and provide differentiated access 
service such that data access policies, which are defined as 
per user attributes or roles, which are managed by the key 
authorities and access the confidential information or 
command reliably by exploiting external storage nodes. 
Some of the most challenging issues in this scenario are the 
enforcement of authorization policies and the policies 
update for secure data retrieval. Cipher text-policy attribute-
based encryption (CP-ABE) is a promising cryptographic 
solution to the access control issues.  
However, the problem of applying CP ABE in decentralized 
DTNs introduces several security and privacy challenges 
with regard to the attribute revocation, key escrow, and 
coordination of attributes issued from different authorities. 
We propose a secure data retrieval scheme using CPABE 
for decentralized DTNs where multiple key authorities 
manage their attributes independently. We demonstrate how 
to apply the proposed mechanism to securely and efficiently 
manage the confidential data distributed in the disruption-
tolerant military network. 
 
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION 
Military applications require increased protection of 
confidential data including access control method In many 
cases, it is desirable to provide differentiated access services 
such that Data access policies are defined over user attributes 
or roles, which are managed by the key authorities. 
 
Fig.1: System Flow 
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III. PROPOSED METHOD 
1) Key Authorities: They are key generation centres that 
generate public/secret parameters for CP-ABE. The key 
authorities consist of a central authority and multiple local 
authorities. We assume that there are secure and reliable 
communication channels between a central authority and 
each local authority during the initial key setup and 
generation phase.  
Each local authority manages different attributes and issues 
corresponding attribute keys to users.  
They grant differential access rights to individual users 
based on the users’ attributes. The key authorities are 
assumed honest-but-curious. That is, they will honestly 
execute the assigned tasks in the system; however they 
would like to learn information of encrypted contents as 
much as possible. 
2) Storage node: This entity stores data from senders and 
provide corresponding access to users. It may be mobile or 
static, we also assume the storage node to be semi trusted, 
that is honest-but-curious. 
3) Sender: This entity owns confidential messages or data 
(e.g., a commander) and wishes to store them into the 
external data storage node for ease of sharing or for reliable 
delivery to users in the extreme networking environments. 
A sender is responsible for defining (attribute based) access 
policy and enforcing it on its own data by encrypting the 
data under the policy before storing it to the storage node. 
4) User: This mobile node wants to access the data stored at 
the storage node (e.g., a soldier). If a user possesses a set of 
attributes satisfying the access policy of the encrypted data 
defined by the sender, and is not revoked in any of the 
attributes, then he will be able to decrypt  and obtain the 
data. Since the key authorities are semi-trusted, they should 
be deterred from accessing plaintext of the data in the 
storage node; meanwhile, they should be still able to issue 
secret keys to users.  
In order to realize this contradictory requirement, the central 
authority and the local authorities engage in the arithmetic 
2PC protocol with master secret keys of their own and issue 
independent key components to users during the key issuing 
phase.  
The 2PC protocol prevents them from knowing each other’s 
master secrets so that none of them can generate the whole 
set of secret keys of users individually. Thus, we take an 
assumption that the central authority does not collude with 
the local authorities (otherwise, they can guess the secret 
keys of every user by sharing their master secrets). 
 
Problems in Proposed Method: 
1) Collusion-resistance: If multiple users collude, they may 
be able to decrypt a cipher text by combining their attributes 
even if each of the users cannot decrypt the cipher text alone 
[11]–[13]. For example, suppose there exist a user with 
attributes {”Battalion 1”, “Region 1”} and another user with 
attributes {”Battalion 2”, “Region 2”}. They may succeed in 
decrypting a cipher text encrypted under the access policy 
of (“Battalion 1” AND “Region 2”), even if each of them 
cannot decrypt it individually. We do not want these 
colluders to be able to decrypt the secret information by 
combining their attributes. We also consider collusion 
attack among curious local authorities to derive users’ keys 
2)Backward and forward Secrecy: In the context of ABE, 
backward secrecy means that any user who comes to hold 
an attribute (that satisfies the access policy) should be 
prevented from accessing the plaintext of the previous data 
exchanged before he holds the attribute. On the other hand, 
forward secrecy means that any user who drops an attribute 
should be prevented from accessing the plaintext of the 
subsequent data exchanged after he drops the attribute, 
unless the other valid attributes that he is holding satisfy the 
access policy. 
3) Key Escrow: In CP-ABE, the key authority generates 
private keys of users by applying the authority’s master 
secret keys to users’ associated set of attributes. Thus, the 
key authority can decrypt every cipher text addressed to 
specific users by generating their attribute keys. If 
adversaries when deployed in the hostile environments 
compromise the key authority, this could be a potential 
threat to the data confidentiality or privacy especially when 
the data is highly sensitive. The key escrow is an inherent 
problem even in the multiple-authority systems as long as 
each key authority has the whole privilege to generate their 
own attribute keys with their own. 
 
IV. REASERCH CONTRIBUTION  
Technologies are becoming successful solutions that allow 
wireless devices carried by soldiers to communicate with 
each other and access the confidential information or 
command by exploiting external storage nodes. Some of the 
most challenging issues in this scenario are the enforcement 
of authorization policies and the policies update for secure 
data retrieval. Cipher text-policy attribute-based encryption 
is a promising cryptographic solution to the access control 
issues. However, the problem of applying CP-ABE in 
decentralized DTNs introduces several security and privacy 
challenges with regard to the attribute revocation, key 
escrow, and coordination of attributes issued from different 
authorities.  
Hence, we propose a secure data retrieval scheme using 
IDEA Algorithm as 3DES with MD5 Algorithm Known as 
Crypto Hybrid Algorithm for decentralized DTNs where 
multiple key authorities manage their attributes 
independently. We demonstrate how to apply the proposed 
mechanism to securely and efficiently manage the 
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3DES with MD5 ALGORTHIM 
Use of multiple length keys leads us to the Triple-DES 
algorithm, in which DES is applied three times. Triple DES 
is simply another mode of DES operation. It takes three 64-
bit keys, for an overall key length of 192 bits. In Private 
Encryption, you simply type in the entire 192-bit key rather 
than entering each of the three keys individually. The Triple 
DES then breaks the user provided key into three sub keys, 
padding the keys if necessary so they are each 64 bits long. 
The procedure for encryption is the same as regular DES, 
but it is repeated three times. Hence, the name Triple DES, 
The data is encrypted with the first key, decrypted with the 
second key, and finally encrypted again with the third key. 
Triple DES, also known as 3DES.  
Consequently, Triple DES runs three times slower than 
standard DES, but is much more secure if used properly. 
The procedure for decrypting something is the same as the 
procedure for encryption, except it is executed in reverse. 
Like DES, data is encrypted and decrypted in 64-bit chunks. 
Unfortunately, there are some weak keys that one should be 
aware of: if all three keys, the first and second keys, or the 
second and third keys are the same, then the encryption 
procedure is essentially the same as standard DES. This 
situation is to be avoided because it is the same as using a 
slow version of regular DES.  
Note that although the input key for DES is 64 bits long, the 
actual key used by DES is only 56 bits in length. The least 
significant (right most) bit in each byte is a parity bit, and 
should be set so that there are always an odd number of 1s 
in every byte. These parity bits are ignored, so only the 
seven most significant bits of each byte are used, resulting 
in a key length of 56 bits. This means that the effective key 
strength for Triple DES is actually 168 bits because each of 
the three keys contains 8 parity bits that are not used during 
the encryption process. 
A commonly used technique in the Internet is to provide a 
MD5 -Hash String so the receiver can compare if the file 
has been transmitted without any modifications.  
3DES encrypts a 64-bit block of plaintext to 64-bit block of 
ciphertext. It uses a 128-bit key. The algorithm consists of 
eight identical rounds and a “half” roundfinal 
Transformation. There are 216 possible 16-bitblocks 
0000000000000000, 1111111111111111. Each operation 
with the set of possible 16-bit blocks is an algebraic group. 
Bitwise XOR is bitwise addition modulo 2, and addition 
modulo 216 is the usual group operation. Some spin must be 
put on the elements – the 16-bit blocks – to make sense of 
multiplication modulo 216 + 1, however. 0 (i.e., 




In particular, the following requirements must be supported 
by the key management scheme, in order to facilitate data 
aggregation and dissemination process:  
1. Data aggregation is possible only if intermediate nodes 
have access to encrypted data so that they can extract 
measurement values and apply to them aggregation 
functions.  Therefore, nodes that send data packets toward 
the base station must encrypt them with keys available to 
the aggregator nodes.  
2. Data dissemination implies broadcasting of a message 
from the aggregator to its group members.  If an aggregator 
shares a different key (set of keys) with each of the sensor 
within its group, then it will have to make multiple 
transmissions, encrypted each time with a different key, in 
order  
to broadcast a message to all of the nodes .But transmissions 
must be kept as low as possible because of their high-energy 
consumption rate.  
3. Confidentiality: In order to protect sensed data and 
communication-changes between sensor nodes it is 
important to guarantee the secrecy of messages.  In the 
sensor network, case this is usually achieved by the use of 
symmetric cryptography as asymmetric or public key 
cryptography in general is considered too expensive. 
However, while encryption protects against outside attacks, 
it does not protect against inside attacks/node compromises, 
as an attacker can use recovered cryptographic key material 
to successfully eavesdrop, impersonate or participate in the 
secret communications of the network Furthermore, while 
confidentiality guarantees the security of communications 
inside the network it does not prevent the misuse of 
information reaching the base station Hence ,confidentiality 
must also be coupled with the right control policies so that 
only authorized users can have access to confidential 
information 
4. Integrity and Authentication:  Integrity and authentication 
is necessary to enable sensor nodes to detect modified, 
injected, or replayed packets. While it is clear that safety-
critical applications require authentication, it is still wise to 
use it even for the rest of applications since otherwise the  
owner of the sensor network may get the wrong picture of 
the sensed world thus making inappropriate decisions. 
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However, authentication alone does not solve the problem 
of node takeovers as compromised nodes can still au-
thenticate themselves to the network.  Hence, authentication 
mechanisms should be “collective” and aim at securing the 
entire network.  
First, we focused on the establishment of trust relationship 
among wireless sensor nodes, and presented a key 
management protocol for sensor networks. The protocol 
includes support for establishing four types of keys per 
sensor node:  
individual keys shared with the base station, pairwise keys 
shared with individual neighboring nodes, cluster keys 
shared with a set of neighbors, and a group key shared with 
all the nodes in the network. We showed how the keys 
could be distributed so that the protocol can support in-
network processing and efficient dissemination, while 
restricting the security impact of a node compromise to the 
immediate network neighborhood of the compromised node.  
Applying the protocol makes it hard for an adversary to 
disrupt the normal operation of the network.  
In Hybrid Cryptosystem System, security is combination of 
more algorithm than base paper but still requires less time to 
Verify and process. While they are not present in the base 
paper. Hybrid Cryptosystem to enhance the security we use 
combination of algos  
1) Idea algo. 
2) MD5  
3) ECB (ELECTRONIC CODE BOOK) 
4) Hashing code 
 
Comparative Result analysis  
In my Base Paper we have used CP-ABE systems i.e. 
Cipher text-policy attribute-based encryption which is a 
promising cryptographic solution to the access control 
issues. While its communication Cost is higher than New 
Hybrid Cryptography Technique. Comparative results can 
see in Graph as:  
 
Fig.7.1: Communication cost in CP-ABE System 
 
Number of conversion and verification time is more in base 
paper CP-ABE System then Hybrid Encryption by Using 
Idea Algorithm and MD5. 
 
 




The corresponding attribute group keys are updated and 
delivered to the valid attribute group members securely 
(including the user). In addition, all of the components 
encrypted with a secret key in the cipher text are re-
encrypted by the storage node with a random, and the cipher 
text components corresponding to the attributes are re-
encrypted with the updated attribute group keys. Even if the 
user has stored the previous cipher text exchanged before he 
obtains the attribute keys and the holding attributes satisfy 
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